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I. INTRODUCTION 
The union of punitive damages and class actions can be aptly 
described with Samuel Johnson’s famous quotation regarding 
marriage: “The triumph of hope over experience.”1 By most 
conventional wisdom, there is little future for plaintiffs or 
defendants who desire to resolve punitive damages claims globally 
using the procedural vehicle of a class action. From a conceptual 
perspective, however, there are circumstances under which the 
union could function. This Article explores those possibilities, not 
in the spirit of normative support, but in the spirit of exploring 
theories that may have some prospective vitality.  
Notwithstanding the chilly reception that punitive damages 
class actions have received from appellate courts, there are several 
approaches at the micro and macro levels of analysis suggesting 
that “hope” is still persistent. By disaggregating the United States 
Supreme Court punitive damages jurisprudence, it is possible to 
identify a limited number of factual scenarios where a class action 
for punitive damages could be successful. These micro-level 
observations can constitute a road map for navigating the current 
seemingly insurmountable barriers that have severely limited the 
use of class actions in punitive damages claims. At the macro 
level, there are two observations that could lead to a revision of 
punitive damages class actions: the seemingly undaunted, 
pragmatic desire on the part of trial judges to resolve similar cases 
collectively, and the powerful support for an economic vision of 
punitive damages that leads inevitably to a global, rather than 
individual, procedural approach.    
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II. RECENT SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES AND CLASS ACTIONS 
Over the last twenty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
there have been nine influential decisions devoted to punitive 
damages and two similarly influential cases related to class actions. 
The interests of the Supreme Court in both areas have been driven 
by a major effort on the part of defendants to limit both the scope 
of liability for compensatory awards and the circumstances and 
amounts available for punitive damages awards.2 At the same time, 
there have been significant efforts in the state and federal judicial 
and legislative arenas to accomplish similar goals by tightening the 
prerequisites for an award of punitive damages and limiting the 
amount that could be awarded, as well as channeling class actions 
into federal court. 
The outcome of these substantive law cases has been a critical 
examination of almost every aspect of a punitive damages claim 
and judicial restrictions on the flexibility of juries and lower courts 
to sustain punitive damages awards.3 The most recent cases, for 
example, have demonstrated a linear, numeric ratio between 
compensatory and punitive damages that is in accord with 
constitutional standards.4 Although most legal research has 
 
 2. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 414–15 
(2003) (plaintiff arguing that an “‘honest mistake’ . . . did not warrant punitive 
damages”). See also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619 (2008) 
(“Exxon raises an issue of first impression about punitive damages in maritime 
law, which falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to decide in the manner of a 
common law court, subject to the authority of Congress to legislate otherwise if 
it disagrees with the judicial result.”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 
559, 564–65 (1996) (BMW argued that its “good-faith belief made a punitive 
award inappropriate,” that “its nondisclosure policy was consistent with the laws 
of roughly 25 States defining the disclosure obligations of automobile 
manufacturers, distributors, and dealers,” and that “its nondisclosure policy had 
never been adjudged unlawful before this action was filed”); TXO Prod. Corp. 
v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 451 (1993) (“TXO argued that the punitive 
damages award violated the Due Process Clause,” and that “vagueness, lack of 
guideline and the lack of any requirement of a reasonable relationship between 
the actual injury and the punitive damage award, in essence, would cause the 
Court or should cause the Court to set it aside on Constitutional grounds”).  
 3. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2623 (“Despite these limitations, punitive 
damages overall are higher and more frequent in the United States than they are 
anywhere else.”). 
 4. Compare Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991) 
(stating that although “more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages” 
might be “close to the line,” it did not “cross the line into the area of 
constitutional impropriety”), and Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 (“[W]e have 
consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple 
mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to 




                                                                                                            
revealed that punitive damages are awarded relatively infrequently 
and amounts are often reduced by appellate courts, the “shadow 
effect” of punitive damages has had a major effect on settlement 
values: defendants tend to settle compensatory damages at a higher 
level in order to avoid the risk of large punitive damages being 
awarded at a jury trial.5
Defendants have generally reacted quite negatively and 
independently to the use of class actions, particularly in personal 
injury cases, where large numbers of plaintiffs can be aggregated 
into one case for trial.6 The attitude of defendants toward the use 
of class actions to settle cases is more nuanced, however. 
Threatened by large numbers of individual claims, some 
defendants prefer to obtain the global peace that might be afforded 
by a class action.7 However, the Supreme Court has been 
extremely skeptical of class actions in personal injury cases. In 
both Amchem Products v. Windsor (Amchem)8 and Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp.,9 the Court rejected class action settlements 
 
 
the punitive award.”), with Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (stating that “[i]n the 
context of this case . . . there is a presumption against an award that has a 145-
to-1 ratio”). 
 5. See generally MARK PETERSON, SYAM SARMA, & MICHAEL SHANLEY, 
INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (1987). 
 6. See Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions 
in Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 595, 600 (1997) [hereinafter McGovern, 
Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions] (“Plaintiffs’ counsel did not want to 
lose control of their cases or have their fees set by judges; defendants felt that a 
divide and conquer strategy was preferable to any form of aggregation where a 
defendant might be forced into a bet-your-company trial.”). See also 
Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. Mo. 1985). See generally In re Fed. 
Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982).  
 7. McGovern, Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions, supra note 6, at 
601 (stating that “in the late 1980’s, defense counsel began to see the potential 
for closing the floodgates of mass tort litigation by the use of settlement 
classes”). See generally Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D 141 (S.D. Ohio 
1992).  
 8. See 521 U.S. 591, 628–29 (1997) (“The argument is sensibly made that 
a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most 
secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure. 
Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution. And Rule 23, which must 
be interpreted with fidelity to the Rules Enabling Act and applied with the 
interests of absent class members in close view, cannot carry the large load 
CCR, class counsel, and the District Court heaped upon it.”).  
 9. See 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999) (stating that “limited fund rationale could 
under some circumstances be applied to a settlement class of tort claimants, it 
would be essential that the fund be shown to be limited independently of the 
agreement of the parties to the action, and equally essential under Rule 23(a) and 
(b)(1)(B) that the class include all those with claims unsatisfied at the time of the 




                                                                                                            
under Rules 23 (b)(3) and 23(b)(1)(B) with rationales that leave 
limited room for a successful certification of a class in future mass 
tort litigation.  
The Supreme Court cases that have reviewed punitive damages 
and class actions together—State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell10 and Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams11—have been similarly limiting. The future opportunities 
for a class certification of punitive damages causes of action are 
narrow, indeed. 
III. DISAGGREGATING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AND CLASS ACTIONS 
Probably the most productive approach for discerning any 
possibility for the certification of a class action for punitive 
damages is to disaggregate the Supreme Court jurisprudence and 
examine each key variable of that jurisprudence separately. Then it 
might be possible to determine which aspect of each variable could 
still lead to a possible scenario for a successful certification of a 
punitive damages class.12  
A. Causes of Action 
There has been substantial discussion of the similarity, or lack 
thereof, among the elements of the theories of liability among 
 
 
settlement negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by recognizing 
independently represented subclasses”). Of note, in both Amchem and Ortiz, the 
lead opponents are plaintiff attorneys. 
 10. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 427 (2003) 
(stating that “[i]n the context of this case . . . there is a presumption against an 
award that has a 145-to-1 ratio”).  
 11. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007) (stating 
that “to permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim would add a near 
standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation”). 
 12. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993) 
(stating that punitive damages “awards are the product of numerous, and 
sometimes intangible, factors; a jury imposing a punitive damages awards must 
make a qualitative assessment based on a host of facts and circumstances unique 
to the particular case before it”). See also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. 
Ct. 2631, 2631 (2008) (“Although the legal landscape is well populated with 
examples of ratios and multipliers expressing policies of retribution and 
deterrence, most of them suffer from features that stand in the way of borrowing 
them as paradigms of reasonable limitations suited for application to this case.”); 
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 (“The precise award in any case, of course, must be 
based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm 
to the plaintiff.”). 




                                                                                                            
potential plaintiffs, particularly with differences in causation and 
defenses. There also seems to be a focus on the level of fungibility 
of damages incurred by plaintiffs with personal injuries as being 
more individually unique,13 financial loss as being more similar,14 
and property and other damages as being somewhere in between.15
B. Relationships 
Attention has also been given to the relationship between and 
among various elements of a putative case:16 the relationship 
between the act and the harm,17 the replicability or hypothetical 
nature of the conduct,18 and the relationship among the potential 
class members.19 There is an underlying Seventh Amendment 
 
 13. See Williams, 549 U.S. at 349; see also Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
945 So. 2d 1246, 1261 (Fla. 2006) 
 14. See generally BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). See 
also Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426 (stating that “[t]he harm arose from a transaction 
in the economic realm, not from some physical assault or trauma; there were no 
physical injuries”); TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 447; Browning-Ferris Indus. 
of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
 15. See generally Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424 
(2001). 
 16. See Williams, 549 U.S. at 353 (stating that “the Constitution’s Due 
Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a 
defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly 
represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to 
the litigation”). 
 17. See Williams, 549 U.S. at 349–50 (“A jury found that Williams’ death 
was caused by smoking; that Williams smoked in significant part because he 
thought it was safe to do so; and that Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led 
him to believe that this was so.”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423 (stating that “[a] 
defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for 
being an unsavory individual or business”); Gore, 517 U.S. at 585 (stating that 
the court assumed “that the undisclosed damage to the new BMW’s affected 
their actual value”); TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 460 (stating that “there is a 
reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely 
to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actually has 
occurred”).  
 18. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 (“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion 
that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even 
one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award.”); see 
also TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 460 (stating that “there is a reasonable 
relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result 
from the defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred” 
(quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1994)). 
 19. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (“Rule 23(a) 
states four threshold requirements applicable to all class actions: (1) numerosity 
(a ‘class [so large] that joinder of all members is impracticable’); (2) 
commonality (‘questions of law or fact common to the class’); (3) typicality 
(named parties’ claims or defenses ‘are typical . . . of the class’); and (4) 




                                                                                                            
concern that the individual right to a jury trial is maintained and 
that rights are not violated simply because of a mere “relationship” 
to others.20
C. Goals 
The focus of the Supreme Court cases has been almost 
completely on overdeterrence,21 with virtually no discussion of 
underdeterrence. This instrumental analysis has been extremely 
forceful in the arguments made by defendants. Because of the 
procedural posture of these cases, there has been no substantial 
occasion or incentive for a plaintiff to focus on the overall efforts 
of coping with overdeterrence at the expense of underdeterrence. A 
second goal has been ending the possibility of multiple punitive 
damages awards against a single defendant arising out of an 
incident with many potential plaintiffs.22 If a defendant moves for 
 
 
adequacy of representation (representatives ‘will fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class’).”). 
 20. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Robert J. Nelson, Class Action Treatment of 
Punitive Damages Issues after Phillip Morris v. Williams: We Can Get There 
from Here, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV., 407, 429–30 n.66 (2008) (stating that “[w]e 
recognize the concerns expressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750–51 (5th Cir. 1996), in 
which that court held that bifurcation of issues in a nationwide smoking class 
action violated the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
However, subsequent to its decision in Castano, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
risk of infringing on the parties’ Seventh Amendment rights is not significant 
and is in fact avoided where the liability issues common to all class members are 
tried together by a single initial jury, and issues affecting individual class 
members such as causation, damages, and comparative negligence are tried by 
different juries”). 
 21. See, e.g., Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142 (2007). See also 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008) (stating that “the 
consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at 
retribution and deterring harmful conduct”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (stating 
“punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant’s culpability, after 
having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the 
imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence”); Browning-
Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989) (“[P]unitive 
damages advance the interests of punishment and deterrence, which are also 
among the interests advanced by the criminal law . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1977) (purposes of punitive damages are “the same” as 
“that of a fine imposed after a conviction of a crime”). 
 22. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 
1967) (“Although multiple punitive awards running into the hundreds may not 
add up to a denial of due process, nevertheless if we were sitting as the highest 
court of New York we would wish to consider very seriously whether awarding 
punitive damages with respect to the negligent––even highly negligent––




                                                                                                            
certification of a class to cabin all future punitive damages awards, 
there is a greater chance for success than if plaintiffs make the 
same motion.  
D. Damages 
Aside from the nature of the damages, there has been great 
attention paid to whether compensatory damages were determined 
prior to an award of punitive damages,23 the ratio between 
compensatory and punitive damages,24 and a comparison of 
comparable civil penalties and punitive damages.25 The single digit 
 
 
manufacture and sale of a drug governed by federal food and drug requirements, 
especially in the light of the strengthening of these by the 1962 amendments, 76 
Stat. 780 (1962), and the present vigorous attitude toward enforcement, would 
not do more harm than good.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1262 (Fla. 
2006) (“Engle Class’[] punitive damages claim, we must vacate the classwide 
punitive damages award because we unanimously agree with the Third District 
that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine a lump sum amount 
before it determined the amount of total compensatory damages for the class. As 
a matter of law, the punitive damages award violates due process because there 
is no way to evaluate the reasonableness of the punitive damages award without 
the amount of compensatory damages having been fixed. The amount awarded 
is also clearly excessive because it would bankrupt some of the defendants.”). 
 24. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (“[W]e 
have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a 
simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential 
damages to the punitive award.”). See also Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2633 
(“Accordingly, given the need to protect against the possibility (and the 
disruptive cost to the legal system) of awards that are unpredictable and 
unnecessary, either for deterrence or for measured retribution, we consider that a 
1:1 ratio, which is above the median award, is a fair upper limit in such maritime 
cases.”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428–29 (stating that “when used to determine 
the dollar amount of the award, however, the criminal penalty has less utility. 
Great care must be taken to avoid use of the civil process to assess criminal 
penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened protections of a criminal 
trial have been observed, including, of course, its higher standards of proof” and 
that “[i]n the context of this case . . . there is a presumption against an award that 
has a 145-to-1 ratio”); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 
462 (1993) (stating that “trickery and deceit” may be more reprehensible than 
negligence); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991) (stating 
that although “more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages” might 
be “close to the line,” it did not “cross the line into the area of constitutional 
impropriety”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 21, § 908 cmt. c 
(“Thus an award of nominal damages . . . is enough to support a further award of 
punitive damages, when a tort, . . . is committed for an outrageous purpose, but 
no significant harm has resulted.”). 
 25. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634; Gore, 517 U.S. at 583 (“Comparing the 
punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be 




                                                                                                            
ratio between compensatory and punitive damages has been the 
“holy grail” for defendants seeking caps on punitive damages 
awards, with its focus on the individual and the individual’s right 
to receive compensation.26  
E. Scope 
The scope of any punitive damages award—state or national;27 
individual or group;28 party or non-party29—has also been the 
 
 
imposed for comparable misconduct provides a third indicium of 
excessiveness.”); TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 456 (“TXO . . . argues that 
punitive damages awards should be scrutinized more strictly than legislative 
penalties because they are typically assessed without any legislative guidance 
expressing the considered judgment of the elected representatives of the 
community.”); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23 (“We are aware that the punitive damages 
award in this case is more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages, is 
more than 200 times the out-of-pocket expenses of respondent . . . and, of 
course, is much in excess of the fine that could be imposed for insurance fraud 
under Ala. Code §§ 13A-5-11 and 13A-5-12(a) (1982), and Ala. Code §§ 27-1-
12, 27-12-17, and 27-12-23 (1986).”); Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 301 
(stating that “the reviewing court must accord ‘substantial deference’ to 
legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue” 
and that “because punitive damages are penal in nature, the court should 
compare the civil and criminal penalties imposed in the same jurisdiction for 
different types of conduct, and the civil and criminal penalties imposed by 
different jurisdictions for the same or similar conduct”). 
 26. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2613 (“In the aftermath of the disaster, Exxon 
spent around $2.1 billion in cleanup efforts. The United States charged the 
company with criminal violations of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) 
and 1319(c)(1); the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407 and 411; the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 and 707(a); the Ports and 
Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1); and the Dangerous Cargo Act, 
46 U.S.C. § 3718(b). Exxon pleaded guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act, 
the Refuse Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and agreed to pay a $150 
million fine, later reduced to $25 million plus restitution of $100 million. A civil 
action by the United States and the State of Alaska for environmental harms 
ended with a consent decree for Exxon to pay at least $900 million toward 
restoring natural resources, and it paid another $303 million in voluntary 
settlements with fishermen, property owners, and other private parties.”); 
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 (“The Court further referenced a long legislative 
history, dating back over 700 years and going forward to today, providing for 
sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish.”). 
 27. See generally Exxon, 128 S. Ct. 2605. See also Campbell, 538 U.S. at 
421 (stating that a state does not “have a legitimate concern in imposing punitive 
damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the 
State[]”).  
 28. See generally Campbell, 538 U.S. 408. See also Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).  




                                                                                                            
subject of much discussion. Because state common law generally 
controls tort damages and because of limits in various state 
jurisdictions, it can be important that any award of punitive 
damages is limited in its scope. Any application of one state’s laws 
on punitive damages or class actions to another state’s citizens can 
be problematic. The same argument applies to damages for an 
individual as opposed to a group and to parties as opposed to non-
parties.30 The classic view of individualistic determinations of 
liability and damages is difficult to translate into a larger setting; 
applying the unique facts of a single party to a group or to non-
parties is usually incompatible with a vision of individual rather 
than group justice.31
F. Nature of Conduct 
Another critical variable in determining the appropriateness of 
punitive damages in Supreme Court jurisprudence is the nature and 
reprehensibility of the conduct:32 whether or not the harm is 
physical or economic,33 whether there is financial vulnerability on 
the part of the plaintiffs,34 and whether or not the conduct involves 
 
 
 29. See Williams, 549 U.S. at 354 (stating that “to permit punishment for 
injuring a nonparty victim would add a near standardless dimension to the 
punitive damages equation. How many such victims are there? How seriously 
were they injured? Under what circumstances did injury occur? The trial will not 
likely answer such questions as to nonparty victims”). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424 (“The reprehensibility guidepost does 
not permit courts to expand the scope of the case so that a defendant may be 
punished for any malfeasance, which in this case extended for a 20-year 
period.”).  
 33. See id. at 425–26 (stating that “because there are no rigid benchmarks 
that a punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we 
have previously upheld may comport with due process where ‘a particularly 
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages’” and 
that “the harm arose from a transaction in the economic realm, not from some 
physical assault or trauma; there were no physical injuries; and State Farm paid 
the excess verdict before the complaint was filed, so the Campbells’ suffered 
only minor economic injuries for the 18-month period in which State Farm 
refused to resolve the claim against them”). See also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (stating that a high ratio may be required when 
“the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might 
have been difficult to determine”); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–93 (1983) 
(“For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less 
serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence.”).  
 34. Compare Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2625 (2008) 
(“And a study of ‘financial injury’ cases using a different data set found that 




                                                                                                            
an isolated incident or systematic activity.35 In addition, the extent 
to which the conduct is intentional,36 accidental,37 or involves 
reckless disregard38 for the well-being of others can implicate the 
level of reprehensibility.  
G. Type of Class Action 
The types of class actions, both state and federal—for example, 
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1),39 23(b)(2),40 and 
23(b)(3)41—constitute an important factor in analyzing whether or 
not punitive damages are appropriate. Of course, the Rule 23(a) 
 
 
34% of the punitive awards were greater than three times the corresponding 
compensatory damages.”), with TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 
U.S. 443, 464 (1993) (“We note, however, that in Haslip we referred to the 
‘financial position’ of the defendant as one factor that could be taken into 
account in assessing punitive damages.”).  
 35. Compare Gore, 517 U.S. at 581, and Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (stating 
that “[t]he Campbells’ have identified scant evidence of repeated misconduct of 
the sort that injured them”), and Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 
349, and Ciraolo v. City of N.Y., 216 F.3d 236, 248 (2d Cir. 2000), with Exxon, 
128 S. Ct. at 2634. 
 36. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429; Gore, 517 U.S. at 581; Browning-Ferris 
Indus., 492 U.S. at 259; Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 248. 
 37. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2612 (“On the night of the spill it was carrying 
53 million gallons of crude oil, or over a million barrels. Its captain was one 
Joseph Hazelwood, who had completed a 28-day alcohol treatment program 
while employed by Exxon, as his superiors knew, but dropped out of a 
prescribed follow-up program and stopped going to Alcoholics Anonymous 
meetings.”).  
 38. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2621 (“Reckless conduct is not intentional or 
malicious, nor is it necessarily callous toward the risk of harming others, as 
opposed to unheedful of it.”). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 
supra note 21, § 500 cmt. a (“Recklessness may consist of either of two different 
types of conduct. In one the actor knows, or has reason to know . . . of facts 
which create a high degree of risk of . . . harm to another, and deliberately 
proceeds to act, or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that 
risk. In the other the actor has such knowledge, or reason to know, of the facts, 
but does not realize or appreciate the high degree of risk involved, although a 
reasonable man in his position would do so.”). 
 39. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (“Rule 
23(b)(1) covers cases in which separate actions by or against individual class 
members would risk establishing ‘incompatible standards of conduct for the 
party opposing the class . . . .”).  
 40. See id. (“Rule 23(b)(2) permits class actions for declaratory or 
injunctive relief where ‘the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 
on grounds generally applicable to the class.’ Civil rights cases against parties 
charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples.”). 
 41. See id. at 615 (“Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification where class suit 
‘may nevertheless be convenient and desirable.’”).  




                                                                                                            
prerequisites must be met as well.42 The post-Class Action 
Fairness Act (CAFA) sensibilities can also have some effect on the 
attitudes of courts toward class actions.43  
IV. POSSIBLE REAGGREGATION SCENARIOS FOR A PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES CLASS ACTION 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (Exxon) provides at least one 
scenario in which there can be a punitive damages class action.44 
In that case the cause of action was the same for all plaintiffs 
arising from a single catastrophe; the relationship among the 
plaintiffs was similar and real; the goal was to prevent 
overdeterrence; the movant was the defendant; the compensatory 
damages were for non-personal injuries—financial and property 
damage—and had been determined; the scope was within a single 
state and all parties were included; the conduct was determined to 
be reprehensible; and the class action was under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
in federal court.45  
Looking to the future, there may be circumstances similar to 
Exxon that will occur. Other scenarios that would meet appellate 
scrutiny for the certification of a punitive damages class action 
could deviate from the Exxon model, but probably not too far. The 
most likely deviations could involve a consumer fraud fact 
situation in a single jurisdiction with all of the parties joined, 
compensatory financial damages determined, and reprehensible 
conduct. There could also be another catastrophe or disaster that 
would contain enough similar variables to Exxon to warrant a 
punitive damages class.46
 
 42. See id. at 613 (“Rule 23(a) states four threshold requirements applicable 
to all class actions: (1) numerosity (a ‘class [so large] that joinder of all 
members is impracticable’); (2) commonality (‘questions of law or fact common 
to the class’); (3) typicality (named parties’ claims or defenses ‘are typical . . . of 
the class’); and (4) adequacy of representation (representatives ‘will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class’).”). 
 43. See generally United States Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2006).  
 44. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008) (“The 
District Court for the District of Alaska divided the plaintiffs seeking 
compensatory damages into three classes: commercial fishermen, Native 
Alaskans, and landowners. At Exxon’s behest, the court also certified a mandatory 
class of all plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, whose number topped 32,000.”). 
The plaintiffs opposed class certification for punitive damages; however, the 
Supreme Court did not review the class certification issue. 
 45. See generally id. 
 46. Id. at 2611 (“On March 24, 1989, the supertanker Exxon grounded on 
Bligh Reef off the Alaskan coast, fracturing its hull and spilling millions of 
gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. . . . On the night of the spill it 




                                                                                                            
Needless to say, these potential scenarios are extremely 
limited. How far a court could go beyond the currently approved 
model is problematic. Another uncertainty is the motivation of 
plaintiffs’ counsel ever to attempt to satisfy these restrictive 
requirements contained in Supreme Court jurisprudence. It is far 
more likely that the plaintiffs would attempt to maximize their 
compensatory damages claims rather than swing for the fences in a 
much riskier endeavor. “Experience” seems to dominate “hope,” 
particularly since the Supreme Court did not address the class 
certification issue in Exxon. 
V. PROPENSITY FOR A GLOBAL VIEW OF SIMILARLY SITUATED CASES 
There has been, however, a persistent tendency on the part of 
trial judges when confronted by large numbers of similarly situated 
cases to attempt to resolve them globally.47 This has been the case 
particularly when litigation presents the possibility of multiple 
punitive damages awards. Trial judges have sought, and will 
continue to seek, procedures for the aggregation of claims in order 
to preempt the need for separate trial after separate trial of cases 
that seem to them quite similar.48 There are also occasions where a 
 
 
was carrying 53 million gallons of crude oil, or over a million barrels. Its captain 
was one Joseph Hazelwood, who had completed a 28-day alcohol treatment 
program while employed by Exxon, as his superiors knew, but dropped out of a 
prescribed follow-up program and stopped going to Alcoholics Anonymous 
meetings.”).  
 47. See Francis E. McGovern, Judicial Centralization and Devolution in 
Mass Torts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2077, 2082 (1997) (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, 
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS 
ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATION, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 131–32 (1995)) 
(stating that mass tort management should consist of “(1) the concentration of 
decision making in one or a few judges; (2) a single forum responsible for 
resolving legal and factual issues; (3) a single substantive law; (4) adequate 
judicial support facilities; (5) reasonable fact-finding procedures, particularly as 
to scientific issues; (6) a cap on the total cost to defendants such as by limiting 
punitive damages and allocations for pain and suffering and a method of 
allocating that cost among multiple defendants; (7) a single distribution plan 
with fairly inflexible scheduled payments by injury based on the need of those 
injured, rather than the social and economic status of plaintiffs, and tailored to 
the availability of private resources”). 
 48. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(“Should the jury be allowed to award in the aggregate any punitive damages it 
finds appropriate, it must be instructed to factor in the possibility that none of 
the unnamed plaintiffs may have suffered any damages. Alternatively, the jury 
could be allowed to award an amount of money that each class member should 
receive for each dollar of actual damages awarded.”).  




                                                                                                            
judge will see a circumstance where punitive damages are 
warranted but have never been awarded.49  
In the drug context there was Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill, 
in which Judge Friendly bewailed the risks of multiple punitive 
damages awards.50 With medical devices, there was the Dalkon 
Shield litigation, in which Judge Williams tried to use the class 
action device to have one trial for punitive damages against the 
A.H. Robins Company.51 In the asbestos litigation, Judges 
Parker,52 Sarokin,53 and Weiner54 all attempted to use class actions 
to resolve large numbers of separate lawsuits with one procedural 
 
 49. See In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The 
class action now certified provides a reasonable and conservative solution 
consonant with legal and equitable tradition” and “provides an opportunity to 
effectively address problems of punitive damages in mass torts. The Tobacco 
litigation is a particularly useful vehicle because it addresses a mature tort with 
many cases already tried, providing some benchmarks for both compensatory 
and punitive damages. An immature mass litigation, where an early punitive 
damage class is assembled without any testing of what juries will do, does not 
permit the mega-analysis appropriate in this mature dispute approaching its 
closing stages.”).  
 50. See 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967) (“Although multiple punitive 
awards running into the hundreds may not add up to a denial of due process, 
nevertheless if we were sitting as the highest court of New York we would wish 
to consider very seriously whether awarding punitive damages with respect to 
the negligent––even highly negligent––manufacture and sale of a drug governed 
by federal food and drug requirements, especially in the light of the 
strengthening of these by the 1962 amendments, 76 Stat. 780 (1962), and the 
present vigorous attitude toward enforcement, would not do more harm than 
good.”).  
 51. See In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 
F. Supp. 1188, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
 52. See generally Jenkins, 782 F.2d 468. See also Cimino v. Raymark 
Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990). 
 53. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (D.N.J. 
1989) (arguing that “[a]nother suggestion for blunting the potential of multiple 
punitive damage awards is a preemptive class action by the manufacturer to 
establish a single punitive damage award binding upon all present or potential 
claimants.” Yet “[i]f the existence of this alternative serves to deny defendants 
so situated the right to claim that successive punitive damage awards for the 
same wrongful conduct are unconstitutional, then manufacturers would be 
placed in an unenviable dilemma as soon as a second suit was instituted.” 
Further, “even if a defendant were inclined to adopt this suicidal course, there is 
some doubt whether it would be successful”).  
 54. See Order, In re Asbestos Bankr. Litig., 1992 WL 423943 (J.P.M.L. 
Dec. 9, 1992) (No. 950) (Judge Weiner argued for and eventually succeeded in 
consolidating 26,639 asbestos claims and conducting multi-district litigation 
before his court). 




                                                                                                            
device.55 In the tobacco litigation, Judge Weinstein and the Florida 
judiciary sought to bring finality to punitive damages claims.56  
With the exceptions of Exxon57 and the older Agent Orange58 
case, there has been little judicial success in these aggregation 
efforts, regardless of whether it has been to avoid multiple punitive 
damages awards, eliminate the need for multiple trials, or assess 
additional damages. A reading of these appellate opinions suggests 
that differences in opinion on this subject are driven less by liberal 
or conservative ideology and more by judges who favor a 
pragmatic, if imperfect, resolution of cases, as opposed to judges 
who view the individual’s right to an individual trial as a matter of 
principle that cannot be violated.  
 
 55. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628–29 (1997) (“The 
argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing 
regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of 
compensating victims of asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted 
such a solution. And Rule 23, which must be interpreted with fidelity to the 
Rules Enabling Act and applied with the interests of absent class members in 
close view, cannot carry the large load CCR, class counsel, and the District 
Court heaped upon it.”). See also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 
(1999) (stating that “limited fund rationale could under some circumstances be 
applied to a settlement class of tort claimants, it would be essential that the fund 
be shown to be limited independently of the agreement of the parties to the 
action, and equally essential under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) that the class 
include all those with claims unsatisfied at the time of the settlement 
negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by recognizing independently 
represented subclasses”). 
 56. See generally In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). See 
also Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006). 
 57. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008) (“The 
District Court for the District of Alaska divided the plaintiffs seeking 
compensatory damages into three classes: commercial fishermen, Native 
Alaskans, and landowners. At Exxon’s behest, the court also certified a mandatory 
class of all plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, whose number topped 32,000.”).  
 58. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 723 
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (“Unlike the asbestos, DES, Dalkon Shield, and Federal 
Skywalk cases, defendants contest liability not just as to individual members of 
the class, but as to any members of the class. Thus, unlike other mass product 
liability cases, a determination of general causation will serve both the interests 
of judicial economy and assist in the speedy and less expensive resolution of 
individual class member’s claims.”).  




                                                                                                            
The Amchem59 and Ortiz60 cases illustrate this point rather 
well. The opponents of class action treatment of the asbestos 
personal injury cases were drawn from both the left and right of the 
political spectrum, and they joined in promoting a more 
deontological approach with the fundamental principle that 
personal injury lawsuits were, indeed, personal and that the 
individual aspects of lawsuits were not fungible.61 This view holds 
that it is impossible to take a global view of the inherent 
differences in each plaintiff’s own circumstances and still satisfy 
due process in the context of the Seventh Amendment.62
The pragmatists tend to represent a more centrist political view 
that “the perfect is the enemy of the good” and that the lack of 
ideal individualization for each case is more than outweighed by a 
faster and more homogenized aggregated process. They favor 
consolidation of similarly situated mass tort cases in order to 
promote access to some justice rather than perfect justice.63 They 
 
 59. Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 628–29 (“The argument is sensibly made 
that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the 
most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos 
exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution. And Rule 23, 
which must be interpreted with fidelity to the Rules Enabling Act and applied 
with the interests of absent class members in close view, cannot carry the large 
load CCR, class counsel, and the District Court heaped upon it.”).  
 60. Oritz, 527 U.S. at 864 (stating that “limited fund rationale could under 
some circumstances be applied to a settlement class of tort claimants, it would 
be essential that the fund be shown to be limited independently of the agreement 
of the parties to the action, and equally essential under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) 
that the class include all those with claims unsatisfied at the time of the 
settlement negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by recognizing 
independently represented subclasses”).  
 61. Compare Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 591, and Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864, 
with BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (stating that a 
high ratio may be required when “the injury is hard to detect or the monetary 
value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine”), and Solem 
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–93 (1983) (“For example, as the criminal laws make 
clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the 
threat of violence.”).  
 62. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001) 
(“Because the jury’s award of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of 
‘fact,’ appellate review of the district court’s determination that an award is 
consistent with due process does not implicate the Seventh Amendment 
concerns raised by respondent and its amicus.”).  
 63. See McGovern, Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions, supra note 6, 
at 607 (stating that “[i]n the mature mass torts, so the pragmatist argument goes, 
the bulk of the cases are currently handled by counsel in the aggregate anyway 
without the trappings of individual rights characterized by an idealistic view of 
due process, so why not recognize this reality and use procedures such as class 
actions that at least would have the benefit of some judicial scrutiny?” 
McGovern also states that “[e]ven if there were agreement with this view of 




                                                                                                            
look more to the practicality available in bankruptcy procedure and 
to the instrumentalism associated with the mass resolution of 
claims via the class action. 
The principle versus pragmatism debate will not end with 
Exxon. In that case, both the plaintiffs and the defendants 
supported a single resolution of punitive damages, and they joined 
issue to contest the appropriate amount of those punitive 
damages.64 The less a cause of action seems unique, the more 
powerful the pragmatic arguments. The more unique the claim—be 
it because of scope, conduct, damages, or relationships—the more 
persuasive the arguments based upon principle.65 The strong 
impetus provided by a trial judge’s desire to approach the claim in 
the interest of judicial economy will probably lead to future 
opportunities to test the limits of the position based upon principle.  
VI. ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR “PUNITIVE DAMAGES” 
The current punitive damages jurisprudence focuses on 
punishment, retribution, and overdeterrence.66 There is another 
rationale that, if adopted by the Supreme Court, would open a new 
avenue for the use of class actions and “extra compensatory,” 
 
 
reality, the more doctrinaire left and right would argue that this is a problem for 
someone other than the federal judicial system: from the left, the legislature 
should provide more judicial resources and from the right, provide a legislative 
claims process; from the left, state courts do a great job and from the right, these 
types of cases belong in state courts anyway.”). 
 64. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008) (“The 
District Court for the District of Alaska divided the plaintiffs seeking 
compensatory damages into three classes: commercial fishermen, Native 
Alaskans, and landowners. At Exxon's behest, the court also certified a 
mandatory class of all plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, whose number 
topped 32,000.”).  
 65. Compare id. at 2613, and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 
538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003), with Philips Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 
354 (2007), and Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1261 (Fla. 2006). 
 66. See generally Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of 
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982). See also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (stating that although “more than 4 times the 
amount of compensatory damages” might be “close to the line,” it did not “cross 
the line into the area of constitutional impropriety”); Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 351–52 (2003) 
(stating that “punitive damages have been used to pursue not only the goals of 
retribution and deterrence, but also to accomplish, however crudely, a societal 
compensation goal: the redress of harms caused by defendants who injure 
persons beyond the individual plaintiffs in a particular case”).  




                                                                                                            
“exemplary,” or “punitive” damages.67 That argument has arisen 
out of an economic analysis of deterrence in the law that suggests a 
need for additional damages—whether they be called “public,” 
“punitive,” “societal,” or “extra-remedial”—to be assessed against 
a tortfeasor beyond the compensatory damages sought by 
individual plaintiffs.68 These damages are designed to ensure that 
the tortfeasor internalizes all of the costs associated with its 
tortious conduct, rather than only the costs associated with the 
limited number of plaintiffs who file a lawsuit.69  
The argument from the perspective of an economic analysis of 
deterrence and damages contends that underdeterrence is as much 
of a problem in motivating appropriate conduct by parties as 
overdeterrence.70 The optimal investment in safety for a party 
occurs when the marginal cost of an investment in safety equals 
the marginal benefits of that investment.71 The tort system 
mandates liability—either through negligence or a strict liability 
 
 67. See Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. 
Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 
392, 392 (2008) [hereinafter Colby, Clearing the Smoke] (stating prior to 
Williams, the court “awarded punitive damages to punish the defendant for the 
harm it caused to all of society, not just the harm that is visited upon the 
individual plaintiff before the court”); Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple 
Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private 
Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 584 (2003) [hereinafter Colby, Multiple 
Punishment Problem] (stating that “[t]he plaintiff’s attorney . . . will ask the jury 
to impose punitive damages in an amount sufficient not only for harming the 
plaintiff, but also for the full scope of harm that its conduct caused to all victims 
and to all of society”); A. Mitchell Polinksy & Steven Shavell, Punitive 
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (1998) (stating 
that “the proper level of total damages to impose . . . is the harm caused 
multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of being found liable”). See 
generally WILLIAMS M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
ACCIDENT LAW (1987).  
 68. See generally Colby, Multiple Punishment Problem, supra note 67, at 
584 (stating that “[t]he plaintiff’s attorney . . . will ask the jury to impose 
punitive damages in an amount sufficient not only for harming the plaintiff, but 
also for the full scope of harm that its conduct caused to all victims and to all of 
society”); Sharkey, supra note 66, at 351–52 (stating that “punitive damages 
have been used to pursue not only the goals of retribution and deterrence, but 
also to accomplish, however crudely, a societal compensation goal: the redress 
of harms caused by defendants who injure persons beyond the individual 
plaintiffs in a particular case”).  
 69. See supra note 67. 
 70. See id.  
 71. See Polinksy & Shavell, supra note 67, at 878 (“If damages are either 
lower or higher than the harm, various socially undesirable consequences will 
result.”). See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and 
Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 273 (1996).  




                                                                                                            
standard—if a party does not invest appropriately in safety; it 
deters by placing liability costs on parties whose conduct results in 
an under-investment in safety.72 The overdeterrence rationale 
focuses on the possibility that the tort system will force a party to 
overinvest in safety because of the threat of tort liability.73 
Excessive punitive damages awards, or even the threat of excessive 
punitive damages awards, might lead a party to exceed the optimal 
level of safety in order to avoid liability. Any such overdeterrence 
would create a suboptimal allocation of resources between the 
marginal costs and benefits.74 Likewise, if the tort system 
underdeters parties from investing in safety, there will also be a 
suboptimal allocation of resources.75 In any given instance of 
conduct by a defendant, this economic analysis suggests that there 
should be no liability for negligence if the marginal cost of safety 
equals its marginal benefit.76 If the legal regime is strict liability, 
the defendant will be liable for all losses caused but will still invest 
the same optimal amount in safety because an appropriate 
allocation of resources will occur when the marginal costs of safety 
and benefit are equal.77 Liability under a strict liability legal 
doctrine will affect the distribution of resources between plaintiff 
and defendant but not the allocation of those resources.  
A problem of underdeterrence can arise in the context of mass 
tortious activity, however, when the tort system does not 
incorporate the harm imposed by a defendant. From the 
perspective of society as a whole, if a defendant faces litigation 
from only ten to twenty percent of the plaintiffs who are tortiously 
harmed—a normal range of lawsuit filings—then that defendant 
will underinvest in safety because it is not fully benefitting from 
 
 72. These concepts are covered in many torts casebooks. See, e.g., JAMES A. 
HENDERSON, JR. & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 38–42, 327–33 
(3d ed. 1988) (discussing the debates concerning the proper goals of tort law and 
the judiciary’s role in achieving these objectives). See also GUIDO CALABRESI, 
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24–33 (1970); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 206–11 (4th ed. 1992); 
Symposium, Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980). See 
also AARON D. TWERSKY & JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., TORTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2008); Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful 
Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 422–24 (1982).  
 73. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2004).  
 74. Id.  
 75. See Polinksy & Shavell, supra note 67, at 878 (“If damages are either 
lower or higher than the harm, various socially undesirable consequences will 
result.”).  
 76. See generally TWERSKY & HENDERSON, supra note 72.  
 77. Id.  




                                                                                                            
the avoidance of liability resulting from an optimal investment in 
safety.78 If only twenty percent of injured plaintiffs sue, then the 
defendants will be responsible for only twenty percent of the 
damages and will, therefore, invest less in safety to correspond 
with the lower benefit of the avoided accidents. Although the 
defendant may thus invest rationally in safety from its own 
perspective, there is a lower than optimal investment in safety from 
the perspective of society reflected in the uncompensated harms of 
the eighty percent of injured plaintiffs who did not sue. As a result, 
from the perspective of society, there has been underdeterrence; 
more accidents were caused because the defendant did not have to 
pay for them—society at large paid for them. If a defendant is not 
obligated to pay for all the harm it causes, it will underinvest in 
safety.79 The ramifications of the defendant’s underinvestment in 
safety are an excess of harm caused to society. The tort system has 
underdeterred defendants.  
It is this potential underdeterrence that leads economists to 
argue that additional damages should be imposed on defendants 
who underinvest in safety because they anticipate that only a small 
percentage of harmed parties will actually seek compensation by 
 
 78. See generally Francis E. McGovern, Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 
88 VA. L. REV. 1721 (2002) [hereinafter McGovern, Tragedy]. See also 
DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 110 (1991); Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts 
for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821 (1995). For the other most frequently cited 
studies of claiming rates, see ALFRED F. CONRAD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE 
ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY 
REPARATION 262–96 (1964) (outlining attitudes and opinions of plaintiffs and 
potential plaintiffs toward filing lawsuits); PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 60 (1985) (noting that 
medical malpractice claims peaked in 1975 at one claim for every eight 
physicians); HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS AND 
LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT 
COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK, 7-1 to 7-35 (1990) (analyzing the potential 
plaintiffs that filed medical malpractice claims); Hazel Glenn, Who Claims 
Compensation: Factors Associated with Claiming and Obtaining Damages, in 
COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 45–65 (Donald Harris 
et al. eds., 1984) (reporting the results of a study that showed only twelve 
percent of injured individuals obtained compensation through the legal system); 
Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing 
the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 544–45 (1981) (reporting 
the results of an empirical study that showed that only three point eight percent 
of people with tort grievances actually filed suit). 
 79. Sharkey, supra note 66, at 367 (stating that “the addition of punitive 
damages in some amount above and beyond compensatory damages is 
warranted” to combat underdeterrence “so that the wrongdoer internalizes all of 
the costs of its actions, and is thus appropriately deterred from causing harm”). 




                                                                                                            
filing a lawsuit.80 The type of damages that can be imposed on 
defendants to raise their marginal benefit curve to the level of 
society’s marginal benefit are often referred to as “public,” 
“exemplary,” “extra compensatory,” or “punitive” damages.81 This 
type of damages does not, however, have a punishment or 
retributive rationale. It is designed to counteract the normal 
underdeterrence of the tort system because of a low propensity of 
individuals to sue, and it has the instrumental goal of achieving 
optimal investment in safety from the perspective of society in 
general.  
Unlike the conception of litigation as a one plaintiff–one 
defendant endeavor, the economic perspective looks at the welfare 
of society as a whole and is correspondingly much more in tune 
with the more pragmatic jurisprudence of supporters of punitive 
damages class actions.82 A single award of damages to achieve an 
optimal level of investment in safety for a defendant could be 
achieved if all plaintiffs in a mass tort brought suit and were 
compensated; there would be no need for an overall damages 
assessment. The reality is, however, that underdeterrence is the 
norm because parties simply do not avail themselves of the tort 
system. The economic rationale argues that the only method of 
achieving optimal deterrence is to make an assessment of all the 
harm caused by tortious conduct.  
VII. ASSESSING SOCIETAL HARM 
A logical question is whether or not it is possible to define a 
marginal benefit curve for society associated with any type of 
tortious conduct. Measuring the volume of tort claims past and 
future has been the subject of extensive analysis and research in a 
 
 80. See supra note 67.  
 81. See generally VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. 
PARTLETT, TORTS: CASES & MATERIALS (10th ed. 2001). See also Colby, 
Multiple Punishment Problem, supra note 67, at 584 (stating that “[t]he 
plaintiff’s attorney . . . will ask the jury to impose punitive damages in an 
amount sufficient not only for harming the plaintiff, but also for the for the full 
scope of harm that its conduct caused to all victims and to all of society”); 
Sharkey, supra note 66, at 351–52 (stating that “punitive damages have been 
used to pursue not only the goals of retribution and deterrence, but also to 
accomplish, however crudely, a societal compensation goal: the redress of harms 
caused by defendants who injure persons beyond the individual plaintiffs in a 
particular case”).  
 82. See Sharkey, supra note 66, at 365 (stating that “[t]he goal is to force 
tortfeasors, and others similarly situated, to internalize the harms to society 
caused by their conduct”). 




                                                                                                            
number of different cases.83 The insurance industry has extensive 
expertise in this type of analysis, and companies set up reserves for 
potential liability on a regular basis.84 In bankruptcy proceedings, 
it is not unusual for a court to estimate the present and future value 
of all tort claims pending against a defendant in accordance, for 
example, with Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.85 
Variations on these themes include litigation settlement viability, 
design, and support; insurance buyouts; litigation risk assessment 
and planning; and operational planning and damage calculation.86 
The quantitative literature and the experience in economic 
prognostication suggest that it is feasible to assess both individual 
and societal harm with significant predictive power.87
At the individual case level, there are numerous analytic tools 
to estimate the value of claims, from case matching, to grids, to 
expert systems, to decision trees, to single algorithms to complex 
algorithms.88 It is possible to look to the history of trials and 
settlements to compare the characteristics of a pending case with 
similar characteristics of previously resolved cases in order to 
 
 83. See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION RISK ASSESSMENT FOR 
INSURANCE COUNSEL (1996).  
 84. Id.  
 85. Estimation of the Number and Value of Pending and Future Asbestos-
Related Personal Injury Claims, In re W.R. Gace & Co., 366 B.R. 302 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2007) (No. 01-01139 (JFK)); Projected Liabilities for Asbestos Personal 
Injury Claims as of April 2001, In re W.R. Grace & Co., 366 B.R. 302; 
FREDERICK C. DUNBAR, DENISE NEUMANN MARTIN & PHOEBUS J. DHYMES, 
ESTIMATING FUTURE CLAIMS: CASE STUDIES FROM MASS TORT AND PRODUCT 
LIABILITY (2004). See also 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (2006). 
 86. See generally DUNBAR ET AL., supra note 85.  
 87. See generally DUNBAR ET AL., supra note 85; Francis E. McGovern, 
Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 660 (1989) 
[hereinafter McGovern, Resolving Mass Tort Litigation] (stating that “fairness––
values of predictability, rationality, and equality of opportunity and strategy” are 
at issue in mass tort litigation). 
 88. See McGovern, Tragedy, supra note 78, at 1729–31. See generally 
Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex 
Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1986) [hereinafter McGovern, Managing 
Complex Litigation]; Francis E. McGovern, Dispute Systems Design: The 
United Nations Compensation Commission, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 
184–87 (2009) [hereinafter McGovern, UN Compensation]; Francis E. 
McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1361, 1364 n.5 (2005) [hereinafter McGovern, Claims Resolution 
Facilities] (“The United Nations Compensation Commission was established 
after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Its role was to determine the amount 
of money to be paid by Iraq to claimants from nearly 100 countries, based upon 
eligibility criteria determined by the U.N. Security Counsel. The money was to 
be paid from a twenty-five percent share of the proceeds from the oil-for-food 
program operating under U.N. auspices.”). 




                                                                                                            
“match” the unknown value of the former with the known value of 
the latter.89 In circumstances where the value of cases is driven by 
a small number of variables, there are grids that can define the 
value of cases depending upon the differentiation in the 
variables.90 As was done in the silicone gel breast implant cases, a 
typical grid might have age, disease, and disability as the three 
major variables defining values.91 An expert system is a more 
complicated series of “if . . . then” statements organized from 
interviews of experts familiar with the relative values of cases. 
Experts can opine that if a person has the following combination of 
characteristics related to symptoms, exposure, age, dependants, 
income, health history, and an unlimited number of additional 
factors, then the value of the case is “x.” Expert systems are also 
used in a number of other contexts, including medical diagnosis.92 
Decision trees are commonly used in decision analyses to isolate a 
number of independent variables to be resolved sequentially to 
reach a conclusion.93 Typically there are several alternative 
decision paths determined, probabilities are placed on the 
likelihood of each path, and the chances of any given outcome are 
calculated mathematically. There are also algorithms that have 
been constructed to provide relative weights to either small or large 
numbers of variables that seem to combine to establish the value of 
a case.94 Most of the asbestos trusts have fairly complex 
mathematical algorithms that can disaggregate the critical aspects 
of an individual’s case and then reaggregate them in a formula that 
reflects the overall value of the case.95 Most mass tort settlements 
 
 89. See McGovern, UN Compensation, supra note 88, at 174 (comparing 
the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal to the United Nations Compensation 
Commission); McGovern, Managing Complex Litigation, supra note 88, at 440 
(comparing United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979), 
aff’d, 712 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1983) with the asbestos litigation).  
 90. See Dow Corning Settlement Facility Annex A, In re Dow Corning 
Corp., 244 B.R. 705 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999).  
 91. See McGovern, Tragedy, supra note 78, at 1736; McGovern, UN 
Compensation, supra note 88, at 184.  
 92. See generally PHILLIP C. GIARRATANO & GARY D. RILEY, EXPERT 
SYSTEMS: PRINCIPLES & PROGRAMMING (4th ed. 2004).  
 93. See S.C. Res. 686, ¶ 2(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES 686 (Mar. 2, 1991); 
McGovern, Tragedy, supra note 78, at 1736; McGovern, UN Compensation, 
supra note 88, at 192.  
 94. See Asbestos Personal Injury Settlement Trust Distribution Procedures 
at 6–15, In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003).  
 95. See Francis E. McGovern, The Evolution of Asbestos Bankruptcy Trust 
Distribution Plans, 62 N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law 163, 173 (2006) 
(“Probably the most dramatic evidence of a change in valuation criteria can be 
seen by the variation in the relative amount of money paid to malignancy claims 
as opposed to the lowest non-malignancy claims. Manville-Original can be used 




                                                                                                            
result in trusts designed to pay all present and future claims based 
upon claim evaluation methodologies that are designed to create 
horizontal and vertical equity for all claimants.96  
At the aggregate level, any number of methodologies are 
currently used to evaluate the total value of all defined tort 
claims.97 These modeling and estimation methodologies typically 
include a factual analysis of available data concerning the relevant 
population, a series of assumptions about the effect of tortious 
conduct on that population, and, finally, a sophisticated 
mathematical analysis using regressions analysis, neural 
computation, and Monte Carlo simulations.98  
VIII. MODELING METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for modeling the total value of liabilities for 
a defined tort has been intensely scrutinized in the crucible of 
litigation.99 This methodology can be applied both to cases that 
have a defined universe of claims, the expectation of future claims, 
or a combination of the two.100
The initial step is to define and describe the target population. 
In the Dalkon Shield case, for example, that definition was 
obtained from marketing data on customers, such as age, 
geographic region, duration, and initiation of use of the product.101 
In the asbestos cases, the sources of information were the 
industries using asbestos and publicly available data on the size, 
turnover, and composition of that workforce.102
The next step is to define and characterize the adverse effects 
of the tortious activity. For the Dalkon Shield case, public health 
 
 
to illustrate the ratio of Mesothelioma to Other Asbestos Disease which was in 
the range of 17:1; for Lung Cancer I 3:1; and for Severe Asbestosis 4:1.”).  
 96. See McGovern, Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 88, at 138.  
 97. See generally supra note 67.  
 98. See Estimation of the Number and Value of Pending and Future 
Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Claims, supra note 85; Projected Liabilities 
for Asbestos Personal Injury Claims as of April 2001, supra note 85; DUNBAR 
ET AL., supra note 85. 
 99. In re Fed.-Mogul Global Inc., 411 B.R. 148 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).  
 100. See generally supra note 67. 
 101. See generally RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF 
THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1993).  
 102. See Estimation of the Number and Value of Pending and Future 
Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Claims, supra note 85; Asbestos Personal 
Injury Claims as of April 2001, supra note 85; Supplemental Report for Mark A. 
Peterson, In re Fed. Mogul Global, Inc., 411 B.R. 148 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) 
(No. 01-10578 (RTL)); DUNBAR ET AL., supra note 85.  




                                                                                                            
experts provided the incidence of pelvic inflammatory disease and 
infertility.103 For the asbestos cases, there were Occupational 
Health and Safety Act (OSHA) epidemiological models for 
asbestos-related diseases, including time, duration, and degree of 
exposure to asbestos.104 There were also the various mortality rates 
for the population at large. Then there was the relationship 
between the incidence of adverse effects and the target 
population.105 This involved matching the incidence of harm to the 
customers or exposed universe. Next was the task of characterizing 
the causal link between use and effect. In the Dalkon Shield case, 
there was no causal link assumed; the causal link was the subject 
of proof.106 In the asbestos cases, the OSHA causal analysis was 
suggested.107 It was then possible to estimate the potential 
population with the adverse effect. The incidence rates were 
applied to the customers or exposed population.108
Under the normal use of this methodology, the next step is to 
characterize the propensity to sue by looking at filings by state and 
age group; settlement values by age, injury, and geography; and 
dismissal rates.109 Once that litigating population is estimated, it is 
possible to apply trial rates of lawsuit behavior to the estimated 
population with the adverse effect. This step illustrates why the 
calculus of a defendant in estimating potential liability for tortious 
conduct inevitably concludes that the cost of that conduct to the 
defendant will be less than the cost to society as a whole. 
The modeling methodology for estimating the total cost of 
tortious conduct would eschew the need for analyzing the 
“propensity to sue” variable and go directly to historical values of 
the estimated population with the adverse effect.110  
IX. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGIES IN BANKRUPTCY 
Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the judicial 
estimation of all legal claims pending against a bankrupt entity111. 
 
 103. See In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 
F.2d 847, 848–49 (9th Cir. 1982).  
 104. See DUNBAR ET AL., supra note 85. 
 105. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ELEVATED RISK OF PELVIC 
INFLAMMATORY DISEASE AMONG WOMEN USING THE DALKON SHIELD (1983).  
 106. See generally “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847.  
 107. See supra note 95. 
 108. See generally KENNETH J. ROTHMAN, SANDER GREENLAND & TIMOTHY 
L. LASH, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY (3rd ed. 2008).  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. 11 USC § 50(c) (2006).  




                                                                                                            
Three approaches have been utilized consistently with the modeling 
methodology described above: generic, sampling, and de novo. 
Under the generic approach, historical data is compiled 
concerning the value of cases that have been previously 
resolved.112 Then data is prepared projecting the potential number 
of claims that must be resolved, either from a defined or projected 
universe of claims. Generally, the estimation is based upon a linear 
calculation of past to future, adjusting for the passage of time.113  
With the sampling approach, a statistically significant sample 
of both previously resolved cases and pending cases are related.114 
Each case is examined to determine its relevant characteristics so 
that the two universes of cases can be compared statistically. The 
values of the previously resolved cases are applied to the relevant 
pending cases, and then that data is extrapolated to the universe of 
cases as a whole.115  
The de novo approach ignores history and creates a new history 
in the context of the estimation hearing.116 Rather than rely on old 
litigation system values, a new series of values are created for 
representative cases, and those new values are then extrapolated to 
the entire universe of claims. Where there are future claims that 
must be estimated, various assumptions based upon the best 
available statistical evidence are used for purposes of 
extrapolation.117
 
 112. See Projected Liabilities for Asbestos Personal Injury Claims as of April 
2001, supra note 85; Supplemental Report for Mark A. Peterson, supra note 102. 
 113. See Estimation of the Number and Value of Pending and Future 
Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Claims, supra note 85; Projected Liabilities 
for Asbestos Personal Injury Claims as of April 2001, supra note 85; 
Supplemental Report for Mark A. Peterson, supra note 102; DUNBAR ET AL., 
supra note 85. 
 114. See McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 87, 
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of opportunity and strategy” are at issue in mass tort litigation). See also Francis 
E. McGovern, Distribution of Funds in Class Actions––Claims Administration, 
35 J. CORP. L. 123 (2009) [hereinafter McGovern, Claims Administration]. See 
generally Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 20.  
 115. See Estimation of the Number and Value of Pending and Future 
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for Asbestos Personal Injury Claims as of April 2001, supra note 85; 
Supplemental Report for Mark A. Peterson, supra note 102; DUNBAR ET AL., 
supra note 85. 
 116. Questionnaire, In re W.R. Grace & Co., 366 B.R. 302 (Bankr. D. Del. 
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W.R. Grace & Co., 366 B.R. 302. 
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X. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES 
Once there has been a determination of the appropriate level of 
investment in safety and corresponding benefit, there are two 
additional issues that remain concerning those resources. For 
purposes of this Article, neither of these issues needs to be 
resolved, but they should be identified.  
In our system of insurance for tortious liability, there are a 
number of mechanisms available to spread risk and compensation. 
Any full-fledged scheme to ensure that there is appropriate 
investment in safety must take into account the ex post nature of tort 
law.118 Defendants make the decision about their safely levels prior 
to any determination concerning liability. As a result, there can be 
substantial moral hazard and adverse selection problems unless the 
tort and insurance systems are sufficiently coordinated to provide 
the predictability, insurability, and accountability necessary to make 
ex ante decisions that result in optimal deterrence.119  
XI. DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES 
The question then arises of what to do with the number 
determined to be the total societal harm caused by tortious 
conduct.120 How should that money be distributed? Again, it is 
within the scope of this Article merely to raise the question, rather 
than answer it. 
The goal in any distribution process would involve appropriate 
incentives to bring attention to tortious conduct, to make equitable 
distribution of available resources both horizontally and vertically, 
and to avoid windfalls.121 There are a number of approaches that 
could be taken. Under the existing tort system, compensation is on 
a first-come, first-serve basis for compensatory damages. It would 
certainly be possible to deduct any compensatory damages paid by 
a tortious defendant from the total award of social damages. If 
there were a risk of an eventual shortfall, there is any number of 
partial distribution, pro rata, focused pro rata, or formal 
 
 118. See generally Guido Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts––The Case of 
Punitive Damages, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 333, 345–46 (M. Stuart Madden 
ed., 2005). 
 119. See generally TWERSKY & HENDERSON, supra note 72. 
 120. See Sharkey, supra note 66, at 351 (2003) (stating that “punitive 
damages have been used to pursue not only the goals of retribution and 
deterrence, but also to accomplish, however crudely, a societal compensation 
goal: the redress of harms caused by defendants who injure persons beyond the 
individual plaintiffs in a particular case”). 
 121. See McGovern, Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 88, at 1366–67.  




                                                                                                            
distribution alternatives.122 It is also possible to award money to 
the state or use additional funds for cy pres awards.123 There is vast 
experience with the distribution methodology used in the global 
settlement of mass tort claims that has generally been recognized 
as appropriate when there is a single sum of money to be divided 
among claimants.124  
For a tortious defendant, one of the major benefits of an 
allocation and distribution of monies for all the harm caused by the 
tortious conduct is finality.125 Under this theory, once a 
determination is made, either by trial or settlement, there would be 
no recourse outside the established fund for a plaintiff to pursue a 
defendant. The outcome would be analogous to bankruptcy in 
terms of the protection afforded a defendant from further litigation 
by the members of the class.126
XII. CONCLUSION 
The marriage of punitive damages and class actions has almost 
inevitably ended in divorce. There are few cases approved by 
appellate courts that have allowed a class action to include punitive 
damages, and under existing Supreme Court jurisprudence there 
are only a limited number of discrete factual situations where any 
future class action may include punitive damages. In addition, this 
jurisprudence has disincentivized both plaintiffs and defendants 
from even attempting to use the class action device in this context 
and has encouraged lawyers to look to alternative procedural paths 
for seeking additional, exemplary, or punitive damages.  
There are, however, several limited circumstances where there 
could be appellate approval of a punitive damages class action. 
These circumstances could occur, for example, in the context of a 
federal class action involving a catastrophe in a single state where 
all parties with similar and real relationships are included, the 
elements of their causes of action are identical, damages are 
financial and have been determined, the defendant has moved for 
class certification of punitive damages, and the punitive damages 
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 124. See McGovern, Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 88, at 1381; 
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as determined are commensurate with the reprehensibility of the 
conduct.  
From a purely theoretical perspective, another possible role for 
a class action in punitive damages cases could materialize if a 
court adopted a separate rationale for punitive damages based upon 
economic arguments that damages for tortious conduct should be 
fully borne by the tortfeasor in order to achieve optimal societal 
deterrence. Under current tort law, only a small measure of the 
total damages imposed by a tortious defendant on society as a 
whole is paid by that defendant because such a small percentage of 
the individual, affected plaintiffs bring lawsuits, resulting in 
underdeterrence from the perspective of society. If a court were to 
adopt a more global economic analysis and decide that those 
defendants were liable for the entire amount of harm that they 
cause, in order to achieve the appropriate balance of over and 
under deterrence there would be an opportunity for the class action 
device and an award of damages above and beyond the 
compensatory damages for individual lawsuits. This award could 
be determined with an analytical process commonly used in 
business and similar to the Section 502(c) estimation process found 
in the Bankruptcy Code.127 Whether called “economic,” “extra 
compensatory,” “exemplary,” or “punitive,” these global damages 
would result in tortious defendants being held responsible for all 
the harm they cause rather than only the subset of harm calculated 
from the damages won by opportunistic plaintiffs. Rather than 
using the ill-fitting “punishment damages” moniker for performing 
the economic function of forcing defendants to internalize the costs 
of their tortious activities, the same outcome could be achieved by 
a combination of class action, estimation, and societal damages. In 
addition to the available methodologies to calculate the appropriate 
benefit from an optimal allegation of resources for safety, there is 
also any number of methods available for the distribution of those 
resources associated with that benefit. The suggestion here is not a 
normative one, but, in the spirit of the Symposium, an exploration 
of possible scenarios that could conceivably occur in the future. 
This combination of class actions and punitive damages would 
occur only if traditional legal doctrines of punitive damages are 
redefined to fit a paradigm consistent with the law and economics 
rationale.  
 
 127. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (2006). 
